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THE JUSTICE MISSION OF THE LAW SCHOOLS
LINDA GREENE'
I want to begin by giving thanks to the spiritual forces that have combined
to make a conference on a Justice Mission possible and to the spiritual forces
which have moved us to come together without financial incentives to discuss
that which I believe ought to be above a price-justice.
Someone said, where there is no vision, a people perish. When I look at the
list of participants in this conference, I dream "What if we could create several
law faculties from the participants here?" We would have not only professors
of law but prophets, people who would continue to give the call to justice even
if their voices might sound like cries in the wilderness.
I offer several passages from Isaiah 59:
None calleth for justice, nor any pleadeth for truth: they trust in vanity,
and speak lies; they conceive mischief, and bring forth iniquity.
Their feet run to evil, and they make haste to shed innocent blood: their
thoughts are thoughts of iniquity; wasting and destruction are in their
paths.
The way of peace they know not; and there is no judgment in their
goings: They have made them crooked paths: whosoever goeth
therein shall not know peace.
Therefore is judgment far from us, neither doth justice overtake us; we
wait for light, but behold obscurity; for brightness, but we walk in
darkness.
We grope for the wall like the blind, and we grope as if we had no eyes:
we stumble at noonday as in the night; we are in desolate places as
dead men .... For judgment but there is none; for salvation, but it is
far off from us; and as for our iniquities, we know them.
And judgment is turned away backward, and justice standeth afar off:
for truth is fallen in the street, and equity cannot enter.
2
What is the justice mission of the law schools? What are several preliminary
questions we might seek to answer? They include:
How should we define both injustice and justice?
How do we identify the places and institutions where injustice is done
and the places where justice might be achieved?
1Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin.
2 Isaiah 59:4-14 (King James).
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What conditions are necessary for the achievement of justice, and how
can conditions conducive to justice be created?
What are the roles of the law schools as institutions in this process? To
lead and exhort all institutions which affect justice-law schools,
courts, law firms both public and private, legislatures-to identify and
eliminate injustice!
What, then, is our obligation? It has been eloquently framed by our
conference organizer David Barnhizer, "To speak truth to power" and as an
obligation of prophetic confrontation. Our task is to explore what prophetic
confrontation would mean in the context of the law schools.
I suggest that the idea of the role of law schools in the delivery of justice is
not a new idea. Some of those here, and some who are not present, have
explored it in their work. The work of Houston and Hastie at Howard, Jean
and Edgar Cahn at Antioch, of Lesnick and Bums and others at CUNY Law
School are examples of the possibility of a law school's institutional
responsibility for justice.
While these institutions and their successors and inheritors continue the
work to institutionalize a law school role in the achievement of justice, most of
the efforts are still viewed as interesting but experiments or as alternatives not
worthy of wholesale and enthusiastic emulation. But the meaning of these
programs and the efforts of these prophets is clear. The prophecy is given. If
we are to frame the mission of the law school in terms of justice, our efforts
mustnot be isolated, occasional, sporadic, temporary programs. Theymust be
systematic, pervasive, enduring and integrating related to our law school
operations.
As scholars, we are often tentative, but I want to be more insistent about my
message. The task of prophetic confrontation is to take the message of justice
and its vital importance throughout the legal community and beyond that
community to every place where justice is implicated, to every place where
justice is openly--or secretly denied.
This is not necessarily an easy task. Those familiar with the Bible know the
problems associated with being a prophet. The way of the prophet is not an
easy one. The prophet is often called to spread an unpopular message or warn
of bad days to come. John the Baptist will never be forgotten, but he lost his
head in the process of prophesying the advent of a heavenly king and kingdom.
Daniel was called in by Belshazzar to interpret the meaning of the handwriting
on the wall. Though his interpretation predicted the downfall of Belshazzar, he
was hailed as a wise man and decorated with gold. Soon thereafter he became
the object of scorn and scrutiny, and found himself in a lion's den facing certain
death.
A second difficulty is that the prophet is often rejected by his peers and his
community. Thus is it said, "[a] prophet is not without honor, but in his own
country, among his own kin, and in his own house."
The lot of the prophet may be both adulation and rejection. Nonetheless, the
ideal of the prophet as a truthsayer is a redeeming ideal. While prophets are
not held strictly accountable for achieving change, they are held strictly to the
standard of truth-telling even under difficult and troubling circumstances.
Truth-telling about justice is our obligation.
[Vol. 40:353
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We must think about how to define both justice and injustice as our first
commitment. We might begin by identifying the work on justice which already
exists. During our time together, we will intensify and expand on a discussion
of justice which has already been achieved. For some time legal scholars have
been talking about injustice, constricted choice, about the masking of
oppression in formal and elegant doctrine, about the dangers which lurk in
procedures untested for the way in which they perpetuate powerfulness and
weakness, and about legal formulations far-removed from the economic and
social context in which they will operate. We also hear about the importance
of listening to the perspectives of reality increasingly voiced by previously
silenced, powerless and marginalized groups. We have a rich start in forming
a jurisprudence of justice and empowerment and inclusive humanity, a
jurisprudence informed by history as well as the actual conditions which give
rise to and shape human knowledge.
Our developing jurisprudence of justice and injustice would keep the
question of power and authority squarely in focus despite words or phrases or
formulations which might obscure it. And, a jurisprudence of empowerment
could well encompass several formulations of justice, including compensatory
and commutative justice, but also would provide an affirmative vision as well.
Such a jurisprudence would go farther than a mere critique. It would inform
a vision about the future. It would be a jurisprudence of hope, a vision about
the circumstances under which the boundaries between existing law and our
aspirations for a just society might be eliminated. We could incorporate in this
idea of justice the knowledge of both male and female visions of justice, not
essentialized but evaluated for the richness they might give to an inclusive
vision of justice. We need to understand how justice is perceived, manipulated,
made to appear apparent or irrelevant, and how the blatant absence of justice
reinforces a coercive ideal which may be tolerable only because the weak and
the powerless suffer its effects. For example, our laws include shoot-to-kill
policies and fleeing felon laws which approve the use of deadly force without
accusation, trial, or conviction. We understand the possibilities of this power
and may recoil from its possibilities, but we also understand that it is not a
policy which will be uniformly-horizontally and vertically applied across the
board. It is a policy which is targeted toward the black, the black male, the easily
identified in our society-those who would have no voice and few advocates in
the event the full range of the coercive possibilities allowed by the law in
question is made manifest. Justice or injustice here can only be understood
against a background of use and enforcement, a world shaped by ideals of
respect for law and protection of the community. But whose community?
A similar situation is the prosecution of pregnant drug addicted mothers
who are accused of abusing their fetuses or "delivering drugs" to their babies.
Roberts has written eloquently on the social and historical significance of such
a policy and its implications as much for privacy as for equality. There are
justice concerns here too. But we can only see their full implications if we
understand the nature of a social context in which the most vulnerable and the
most exposed person with no personal resources may be the suffering addict
herself. In such a context justice must include compassion, feeling, mercy,
forgiveness, and love and anger. These, however, are the elements excluded
from so much of what we call jurisprudence.
1992]
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In addition, we should consider the need for compassion, the harm produced
by irrationality, the sensitivity for human concerns which is lost in the
technocratization of equality as well as in the rationalization which minimize
the obligation to compensate those who have been grievously wronged. We
would seek to define justice as more than mere obedience to the extant rules of
society and instead understand justice as a process of reformulation and
reinterpretation of society's rules in pursuit of a comprehensive jurisprudence
of empowerment.
It will be difficult to form a single phrase or sentence which will embody our
framework for justice, but we can begin by thinking about what we must take
into account. We should explore a variety of ideas concerning the meaning of
justice which have profound implications for the reshaping of power relations
among people who seek justice and those who dispense justice. David
Barnhizer has challenged us to take up the prophetic responsibility of speaking
the truth to those in power. More fundamentally, we should join those who ask
what is the truth and who is excluded from its formulation?
We must also begin to identify the places and institutions where injustice is
done and where justice might be achieved. One of those places is in the
classroom. The idea of incorporating justice in our teaching milieu is also not
innovative. A perusal of the curricula of law schools reveals many courses
which squarely address the issues of justice. There are, too, isolated attempts
to infuse the concern with justice into the curricula as a whole, to make its
consideration a routine part of legal education. CUNY, Antioch, Washington,
D.C., and the University of Maryland have programs that seek to integrate
justice concerns throughout their curriculum. University of Wisconsin Law
School professors have developed contracts case materials which address the
practice of contract law and raise questions of fairness and justice in contractual
relationships. However, it is also possible that the classroom per se is an
inadequate venue for the exploration of justice issues and that these issues may
only be fully understood after exposure to the concrete experiences which give
rise to legal claims.
Justice must also be a concern in our writing. Here, too, theory and abstract
may obscure rather than reveal justice concerns.
Justice must be exemplified in our work in the community and in our public
service.
Justice must be exemplified in our own administration of the law schools.
The questions of justice in our own law school behavior have not been resolved.
On the whole, we have made important change in the improvement of access
to the legal profession. Just twenty years ago the law schools of America were
overwhelmingly white and male. Many of our student bodies now have almost
equal numbers of males and females. Black law students were just one percent
of all law students in 1965,4.3% in 1972, and 6.3% in 1991. Minority law student
(Vol. 40:353
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol40/iss3/9
JUSTICE MISSION OF THE LAW SCHOOLS
enrollment was 6000 in 1971 and triple that number-19,410-in 1991.3 There
is now a consensus that students of color ought also to be admitted but even
after twenty years there is still much to be accomplished. Discussions of student
diversity and access to the legal profession still stir feelings of resentment and
hostility. This resistance began as soon as policies and commitments on the part
of the law schools seeking the greater inclusion of students of color were
pursued.
This great progress in enrollment may tempt us to forget the historical and
current controversy over inclusion of minorities in the legal profession. We
must remember that in 1971, the same year in which there were barely 4% black
law students, the controversy over that inclusion crystallized in the Defunis case
debate. Just several years later, in Bakke, the Supreme Court barely sustained
the constitutionality of infant programs of inclusion. In just two decades the
discourse of inclusion as a matter of right has been obscured by a discourse of
white innocence and entitlement. The concern about the legitimacy of a justice
system which bars large numbers of people on grounds associated with class
and race has been replaced with a meritocracy alarm. The argument that the
justice system and related legal institutions must reflect society and include all
groups is often rejected in favor of a diluted diversity claim. All too often the
new diversity rhetoric implicitly denies claims of entitlement and reparation.
And while we tiptoe carefully through a thicket of these thorny inclusion
issues, we also hesitate to firmly address the unresolved question whether
access to legal services should continue to depend upon an individual's
financial resources. Perhaps legal education institutions were ill-suited to
address larger justice concerns by virtue of their historical exclusionary nature.
Perhaps our tentativeness on larger questions of justice is traceable to this
recent past.
The history of exclusion has been costly, forgotten, and suppressed. It is not
taught, nor mentioned; perhaps it is not even fully understood by those who
lived it.
In any event, the history is buried beneath the rubbish of two decades in
which our discourse about equality has shifted like sand in the political and
judicial tides. The ground of justice has been lost in the shuffle. In its place is
an easy accommodation of the status quo. As more students of all backgrounds
desire to enter the study of law, the questions of class, money and access to legal
training become more contentious. Nonetheless, there remains unresolved
questions about our commitment to provide access to legal training for a truly
representative portion of our population.
The justice mission must implicate all of our assumptions about merit. These
professional-related justice questions concern the sharing of power and the role
and influence of the lawyer. They concern the opportunity of people to raise
3 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE
PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT - AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 24 (1992).
1992)
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issues of status in a legitimate voice. They concern the opportunity to share
power in a profession which virtually monopolizes peaceful dispute
resolution. A discussionofjustice in this context involves a discussion of power.
Is there justice in the distribution of minorities and persons of color on our
law school faculties? The following statistics from a 1987 Society of American
Law Teachers' survey present the reality of the situation:
• 3.7% were black;
* .7% Latino (seven-tenths);
0 1.0% minorities (one percent);
* 20% females 4 (twenty percent).
Here, too, the history of inclusion has only been recent. It is improving yet
still dismal in outlook and mood. The revised report outlined the findings from
a 1986-87 study done by the Society of American Law Teachers. The SALT study
found:
. 26.4% of American law school faculties had no minority faculty
members;
• 25.7% had just one minority teacher;
* 23.6% had more than three minorities on their staff;5
0 48 schools had no black faculty member.6
Hispanic figures collected by Professor J. Olivas are also troubling.7 Fifty-one
(51) of 5,700 law faculty members are Hispanic. This is in a nation expected to
grow to 30-40% Hispanic population in the next twenty-five years.
The battle here is not to frame the debate about inclusion. Even the framing
of the debate as one of merit begs the question on the substance of merit. It
certainly obscures the process through which the standards now used to
determine merit were formulated. We must speak frankly about the questions
of power and authority imbedded in the characteristics of the existing
professoriate and the characteristics of our recent law graduates who seek to
become professors. The role model argument, enrollment diversity rationales,
and token systems of inclusion do not begin to address the concerns of justice
and fairness implicated in the monopolization of authority and the
transmission of knowledge. Of all the issues of justice we must address, this
one is the most sensitive because it requires that we implicate our own exercise
of power and its possible illegitimacy and our own responsibility and risks.
4 Richard Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on
American Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 537, 538 (1988).
5 Id. at 558.
6 Id.
7paper delivered at Association of American Law Schools (AALS)
Conference, "The Role of the Minority Law Professor," September 1992.
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The Pursuit of Justice in Relationships
An issue of justice is present in career placement, our relationships to law
firms, both public and private.
In our relationship to the courts and other institutions which purport to do
justice, is there justice in the assignment of judges, prosecutors, public
defenders, and case bargaining? We can call for changes in these behaviors and
institutions, but we cannot achieve it through our ideas alone. Courts, political
campaigns, financing, and allocations are all involved. Who will represent us
in the legislature, in the city councils, in the state houses-and legislatures, the
primary venues in which the politics of justice are shaped and folded?
Where the politics of justice are addressed, the question of who speaks for
those interests which would shape justice is part of its very definition. Critical
issues include the failure to explore the role of policymaking institutions in the
creation of conditions of justice and injustice and the need to evaluate how
those institutions, their structure, their responsiveness to money and other
forms of influence impede both access to justice as well as the substantive
content of policy. What are the politics of justice? How are policymaking
institutions responsive to justice concems and how are these concerns raised
and explored? Are policymaking institutions too remote to be responsive to
justice concerns?
At What Junctures and With What Intensity?
We have exhibited our concern for justice in our clinical programs. Some of
our students may choose to represent the poor, or work with prosecutors,
defense attorneys, in prisons and in housing courts. We want our students to
have an opportunity to work with the poor and in the institutions which
dispense public "justice" such as prosecutors, defenders, Attorneys General,
etc. Should we mandate these experiences, though?
The opportunity to experience justice first hand is still just an option for most
law students. Except at a very few law schools, working in the places where
the real conditions of justice and injustice are made plain-where people are
processed and sorted impersonally, where they get, as my colleague Stuart
Macaulay said, "not due process, but a deal" is an optional experience. We use
words like choice or option to describe the process in which students are
exposed to justice concerns. But we should know that the very idea of choice
in the context we have created is problematic.
Our students know we are ourselves ambivalent about the value of our
clinical programs that would expose them to real justice. We house these
programs in old buildings away from the law school and keep "clients" out of
our main corridors. We pay the clinical teachers less money, sometimes only
half as much as we pay other professors, and we do not allow them to
participate in our political deliberations or governance decisions. Most often,
we do not even know their names. We speak of two types of teachers, those
with promise and those who might make good clinical instructors. In short, we
devalue the latter group in publicly palpable ways. Moreover, we do not
participate in their work or lend our assistance to their advocacy. We have, in
short, created a structure of hierarchy with barriers which devalue the choices
we have created.
1992]
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Moreover, to the extent that what we call "the traditional law firms" do not
require that students demonstrate a concern for problems of justice and may
even be skeptical about students who have had such exposure, law students
incur professional risks when they take seriously the idea of participation in
existing programs. As things now stand, American law schools both actively
and passively limit such exposure. Students who do clinical work understand
the consequences of these choices in the job market. They are met with skeptical
stares from hiring associates who wonder aloud whether their exposure to
clinical work might make the interviewee uncomfortable with some of "our
clients." It is true that there are law firms which tout to students the pro bono
opportunities which exist at their firms and who offer meaningful
opportunities for associates to work on cases in which the concerns of justice
are clear., Yet other realities make the full-time pursuit of these programs
unpalatable and professionally costly.
Does the skepticism felt by some law faculty members about these programs
make our aspiration to do justice an opportunity for derision? I hope not. No,
we must still aspire to the pursuit of justice and recoil when we see
extraordinary evidence that it is not being done. We know that the killing of
death row inmates who have no counsel or have only suffered the ineffective
efforts of incompetent lawyers is not justice. But we also know we are still
unwilling to restructure the system of our "preferences" and "choices" to insure
a more just system.
During this conference we will be talking about what we would want to have
said about us 50 years from now, or perhaps one hundred years later, after we
are gone. What would we want said about the legal profession, about legal
education, about our students, about our professors, about our courts, about
our judges, about our legal system as a whole? Would we be satisfied if they
talked about our student selectivity ratings, about student LSAT's, about the
number of placement call-backs our students received, or how many dinners
at $100 per person students enjoyed during a summer associateship? Would
we be satisfied if our students said, "we have fine buildings for our courts,
beautiful wool gabardine robes for our justices, and finely carved mottoes with
alabaster angels and marble lady justices all around?" Look at our 500 person
law firms with personal elevators for the partners and limousines for rides
across town.
Would we be satisfied if anthropologists described the pecking order of our
law schools and their rituals-law reviews, clerkships, personal blessings and
symbolic trappings-which lead to priesthoods in our law schools?
Would we be satisfied if they talked about our footnotes, the number of
articles published, the pay raises we receive, and the scant hours spent in
teaching?
Would it be enough if they knew that the University of California-Berkeley
Law Library, my alma mater, contains a half-million volumes, or that in 1991
Yale had almost 700,000, or that in Harvard Law School the library has
accumulated close to one and one half million books? Would we be satisfied if
they pondered the number of students in our law schools and the salaries they
obtained upon graduation? I hope that your answer is a resounding "no!" In
the long run, the enduring legacy in your legal system will be the ideas of
justice we leave behind.
[Vol. 40:353
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Conclusion
At the end of a sermon, Martin Luther King, Jr. asked his followers to
remember him for his commitment to justice. His words are haunting because
his last campaign on behalf of sanitation workers in Memphis underscored his
commitment to salvage the humanity of essential yet unvalued people. His
prescient anticipation of death seemed to sharpen his acute judgment that
justice-not worldly fame or prestige-must be our priority.
And if you get somebody to deliver the eulogy, tell them not to talk too
long. Tell them not to mention that I have a Nobel Peace Prize, that
isn't important. Tell them not to mention that I have three or four
hundred other awards .... Tell them not to mention where I went to
school. ... I'd like somebody to mention that day, that Martin Luther
King, Jr. tried to give his life serving others. I'd like for somebody to
say that day, that Martin Luther King, Jr. tried to love somebody.... I
want you to be able to say that day, that I did try to feed the hungry.
And I want you to be able to say that day, that I did try, in my life, to
clothe those who were naked. I want you to say, on that day, that I did
try, in my life, to visit those who were in prison. I want you to say that
I tried to love and serve humanity. Yes,... say that I was a drum major
for justice.8
A Conference on the Justice Mission of the Law Schools is timely, and King's
words offer to us a vision of that mission. They demand that we reexamine the
role of the law school to determine whether we have taken into account the
question of justice while ordering our institutional priorities. The title of this
conference implicitly asks whether we can continue to reproduce legal culture
without evaluating the impact of that culture on both the powerful as well as
the powerless. Legal educational institutions cannot right all historical wrongs
or solve the problems of our nation which have been caused by a particular
conception of the role of law in society. But we can play a catalytic role as
prophets of justice who raise disturbing yet direct questions about the
relationship, if any, between the mission of legal education institutions and the
problem of justice.
8 Martin Luther King, Jr., The Drum Major Instinct, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE:
THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGSOF MARTIN LUTHER KING 259,267 (James Washington
ed., 1986).
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